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Hopes are high that removing fossil fuel subsidies could help to mitigate climate change 
by discouraging inefficient energy consumption and levelling the playing field for 
renewables1–3. In September 2016, the G20 countries re-affirmed their 2009 
commitment (at the G20 Leaders’ Summit) to phase out fossil fuel subsidies4,5 and many 
national governments are using today’s low oil prices as an opportunity to do so6–9. In 
practical terms, this means abandoning policies that decrease the price of fossil fuels 
and electricity generated from fossil fuels to below normal market prices10,11. However, 
whether the removal of subsidies, even if implemented worldwide, would have a large 
impact on climate change mitigation has not been systematically explored. Here we 
show that fossil fuel subsidy removal would have a small impact on global energy 
demand and carbon dioxide emissions and would not increase renewable energy use by 
2030. Subsidy removal would reduce the carbon price necessary to stabilize greenhouse 
gas concentration at 550 parts per million by only 2–12 per cent under low oil prices. 
Removing subsidies in most regions would deliver smaller emission reductions than the 
Paris Agreement (2015) climate pledges and in some regions global subsidy removal 
may actually lead to an increase in emissions, owing to either coal replacing subsidized 
oil and natural gas or natural-gas use shifting from subsidizing, energy-exporting 
regions to non-subsidizing, importing regions. Our results show that subsidy removal 
would result in the largest CO2 emission reductions in oil- and gas-exporting regions, 
where reductions would exceed their climate pledges and where subsidy removal would 
also affect fewer people below the poverty line than in lower-income regions. 
Fossil fuel subsidies amounted to about $330 billion worldwide in 2015 (referring to the US 
dollar in 2005, throughout) after having reached about $570 billion in 2013. This fall in 
subsidies could be partly a sign of reform or simply a reflection of today’s lower oil prices, 
given that historically subsidies have followed the oil price11 (Supplementary Figure 1). It is 
therefore too early to say whether subsidies will continue to fall, stabilize, or increase if oil 
prices rise again. Earlier work found that global subsidy removal by 2020 would reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 5% (ref. 12) -6%  (ref. 13) by 2035 and 6% (ref. 12) -8% (refs 
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14, 15) by 2050. However, all of these studies were done using a single model and none of 
them explored variations in the oil price which greatly affects the size of subsidies.  
We use five Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) to evaluate the global and regional effects 
of fossil fuel subsidy removal on emissions, energy mix and energy demand under both low 
and high oil prices. In the high oil price scenarios, oil prices exceed $100/barrel and in the 
low oil price scenarios they drop below $60/barrel by 2020 (Figure 1).  
The IAMs we use vary in their modelling approaches and solution mechanisms 
(Supplementary Table 1, Supplementary Text 1 and 2), which improves the robustness of the 
results in the face of structural model uncertainties. They include four technology-detailed 
energy-economy models and one multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium model. An 
important difference across models, which affects the modelled effects of subsidy removal, is 
the responsiveness of energy supply and demand to changes in energy prices (Supplementary 
Tables 1 and 2, Supplementary Texts 2 and 3).  
Figure 1: Modeled high and low oil price scenarios. Historical prices represent crude oil prices 
from ref. 16 and are shown through 2015. Modeled prices start in 2020. 
 
We follow the IEA and OECD definition of fossil fuel subsidies as government support to 
consumption or production of oil, gas, or coal which lowers their prices below normal market 
prices (Methods). This definition excludes un-priced environmental and social externalities 
such as air pollution and related health effects which are included in some other estimations17 
but are not appropriate for the purpose of this paper (Methods). We compiled a global 
comprehensive dataset of fossil fuel subsidies8,10,11,18,19 under both high and low oil prices 
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(Supplementary Tables 3 and 4, Supplementary Text 4 and 5). In 2013, when oil prices were 
relatively high, subsidies amounted to approximately $570 billion (Supplementary Table 5), 
including $340 billion for oil, $110 billion for natural gas and electricity (each), and $5 
billion for coal (Figure 2). Only $22 billion (less than 4%) were production subsidies 
(Supplementary Table 3). Following the decline in oil prices, subsidies fell to about $330 
billion in 2015, which amounted to about 10% of energy-related market transactions 
(Supplementary Table 6). 
Figure 2. Current and projected fossil fuel subsidies without reform. (a) global subsidies in 2013 
(high oil prices), in 2015 (low oil prices), and in 2030 under high and low oil prices projected in 
different models. (b) the regional distribution of subsidies in 2015 (Supplementary Table 5). (c) 
subsidies in 2013 and 2015 (Supplementary Table 5) and in 2030 under high and low oil prices in 
each region (model median). For model ranges and additional years see Supplementary Table 5, 7 
and 8. The map presents a stylistic representation of regions. For regional definitions see 
Supplementary Tables 9-14. 
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In our scenarios, we model subsidy rates in a way consistent with historical patterns 
(Methods). Under high oil prices, by 2030, global subsidies would grow to between $750 and 
$970 billion; under low oil prices, subsidies would be between $550 and $700 billion through 
2030 (Supplementary Table 5). In the subsidy removal scenarios, their phase-out starts in 
2020 and is fully completed by 2030.  
The three oil and gas exporting regions, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Russia+  
(the + is used to refer to regions which constitute more than the named country – see 
Supplementary Table 9 for region definitions) and Latin America accounted for about two-
thirds of all fossil fuel subsidies worldwide in 2015 (Figure 2). In Latin America and MENA, 
about half of total subsidies goes to oil. In Russia+, about half of total subsidies goes to 
natural gas and the remainder to electricity (mostly generated from natural gas). Of these 
three regions, subsidy expenditures would grow the most in MENA which would experience 
the largest growth in energy use (Figure 2). 
Developing and emerging economies (India+, Rest of Asia, Africa, and China+) currently 
have lower subsidies than the oil and gas exporters, but their subsidies may grow faster in the 
future (Figure 2). Without reform, subsidies in India under high oil prices could become 
comparable to those in Latin America and Russia+ by 2030. In these regions, over half of all 
subsidies go to oil e.g. through depressed road fuel prices (in countries in the Rest of Asia 
region), tax breaks on road fuels (in China), or kerosene subsidies (in India and Africa) 
Subsidies in the developed regions (Europe, North America and Pacific OECD) accounted 
for about 13% of subsidies worldwide in 2015, and are not projected to grow very much in 
the future. 
Subsidy removal would lead to a small decrease in global CO2 emissions: 0.5-2 Gt CO2 or 1-
4% by 2030 under both low (Figure 3, Supplementary Figure 5) and high (Supplementary 
Figure 5 and 6) oil prices. This is much less than the Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs) from the Paris climate agreement, which add up to a decrease of between 4-8 Gt 
from fossil fuels and industry. Subsidy removal would reduce the average global carbon price 
in 2020-2050 required to achieve modest climate goals (an atmospheric concentration target 
of 550 parts per million CO2 equivalent by 2100 or a probable 2-2.3°C temperature increase 
in 210020) by an average of 2-12% or $0.7-2.1 per ton CO2 under low oil prices 
(Supplementary Text 6 and Supplementary Tables 16 and 17). 
Even though the oil price has an impact on the absolute level of subsidies, it does not greatly 
affect the impact of subsidy removal on emissions because the latter depends on the ration 
between subsidies and energy prices, which is similar in the low- and high-oil-price 
scenarios. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the low-oil-price scenarios; the high-oil-price scenarios 
are illustrated in the Supplementary Information and described in the text wherever they are 
very different.  
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The impacts of subsidy removal are distinctly different in two groups of regions. In oil and 
gas exporting regions (MENA, Russia+ and Latin America), subsidy removal leads to the 
largest emission reductions, equivalent to or greater than their relatively modest NDCs. In all 
other regions, emission reductions from subsidy removal are generally less than their NDCs 
(Figure 3 and Supplementary Figure 6). 
Figure 3 Global and regional impact of subsidy removal and NDCs on CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuels and industry under low oil prices. (a) The impact of subsidy removal on global annual 
emissions compared to each model’s Baseline. (b) The impact of subsidy removal on cumulative 
change emissions from 2020 to 2030 at the regional level (colored bars). Solid lines represent 
emission effects of unconditional NDCs and dashed lines of conditional NDCs – both modeled in 
MESSAGE21. The uncertainty ranges for these effects arise from different historical emission 
inventories, alternative accounting, attribution of non-commercial biomass and uncertainties in 
formulations of NDCs (Methods, Supplementary Table 15, ref. 21). See Supplementary Figure 6 for 
high oil prices Supplementary Figure 5 for global relative changes and regional absolute changes. 
 
In Russia+, where most subsidies are for natural gas (including electricity generation), 
subsidy removal would reduce the use of natural gas and generally lead to higher emission 
reductions than the modest NDC. In MENA and Latin America, subsidy removal would 
decrease oil and natural gas use leading to emission reductions generally comparable to the 
so-called ‘conditional’ NDCs (i.e. commitments dependent on international action) but 
generally larger than the unconditional NDCs. 
Developing and emerging economies which are not major oil and gas exporters would 
generally experience smaller emission impacts (both in absolute terms and in relation to their 
NDCs) from subsidy removal due to lower subsidy levels. The main effect of subsidy 
removal in India+, would be reduced use of oil and natural gas, and in the Rest of Asia – 
slightly reduced use of coal and oil. In both regions, the decline in emissions would be 
generally smaller than the NDCs. In China+ subsidies are lower and the impact of their 
removal would also be small in comparison with the NDCs. In Africa, subsidy removal 
would also have a much smaller effect than the NDCs (and in one model would even lead to 
an increase in emissions due to the substitution of oil with coal). 
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In the three developed regions (Europe, North America and Pacific OECD) with low 
subsidies, the main impact of global subsidy removal is driven by the change of the price of 
fossil fuels on the global market. As oil and gas exporters reduce domestic demand by 
removing subsidies, they make more resources available for the global market. This can for 
example lead to increased use of natural gas in Europe (Figure 4). This effect is more 
pronounced in models with more flexible energy trade. The resulting change in emissions can 
either be negative or positive depending on whether the cheaper natural gas substitutes oil 
and coal or leads to an increase of consumption. All in all, subsidy removal would lead to 
much smaller emission reductions than the NDCs. 
Although the above results are robust for all models, there are certain variations, due to 
different features and assumptions of particular models. The most notable difference is that in 
some regions, subsidy removals can unexpectedly lead to an increase in emissions. In India+ 
(MESSAGE) and Africa (REMIND) this occurs because these models assume more 
flexibility in fuel substitution. As a result, removing subsidies leads to substitution of oil or 
natural gas with more carbon-intensive coal resulting in either increase or smaller reductions 
of emissions. In addition, REMIND assumes the most flexible international energy trade 
which means that energy importing regions (Europe, Pacific OECD and North America) 
increase the use of natural gas (and therefore greenhouse gas emissions - Figure 3) after it 
stops being subsidized in energy exporting regions. Other less notable differences are 
discussed in Supplementary Text 2. 
Our results show that removing fossil fuel subsidies would somewhat lower global energy 
demand. The decrease in energy demand is caused by increasing energy prices and ranges 
between 5 and 26 EJ/year or 1%-4% in 2030 (Supplementary Figure 7 and 8). Under high oil 
prices, the decrease in demand is somewhat larger, reaching up to 30 EJ/year or 7% in 2030 
(Supplementary Figures 7 and 8). The decrease in demand is largest in oil and gas exporting 
regions (MENA, Russia+, and Latin America) whereas in some energy-importing regions 
energy use could even increase following subsidy removal due to larger availability of natural 
gas on international markets as discussed above.  
In addition, removing fossil fuel subsidies would not strongly stimulate the growth of 
renewable energy by 2030 (Figure 4). In general, fossil fuel subsidy removal leads to an 
increase in the share of renewables in regional energy mixes by less than 2 percentage points 
(Supplementary Figure 13). A slightly larger increase may occur under high oil prices in 
bioenergy in Russia+, MENA and Latin America or solar energy in MENA and Russia+ 
(Supplementary Figures 10-12). Beyond 2030, subsidy removal could stimulate more 
noticeable growth of renewable energy, in particular bioenergy under certain modeling 
assumptions. 
A more pronounced effect of fossil subsidy removal is the switch from one fossil fuel to 
another, for example from subsidized natural gas and oil to coal in MENA, Russia+ and 
India+ as well as from coal and oil to natural gas in Europe (Figure 4) which highlights the 
need to consider systemic effects of subsidy reform policies. The switch between fossil fuels 
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is more pronounced in models with higher flexibility of supply and lower flexibility of 
demand as well as higher flexibility of international trade (Supplementary Text 2). Another 
more granular effect is the slow-down of the switch from solid fuels (coal and firewood) to 
natural gas and kerosene amongst the poor, as shown by IMAGE (a model representing 
different income groups – Supplementary Figure 9). This is in line with earlier findings: as 
modern fuels become more expensive, lower income groups are unable to avoid traditional 
fuels, unless supportive policies are implemented in parallel22,23. 
Figure 4 Change in supply of different fuels resulting from subsidy removal in 2030 in four 
regions under low oil prices. MENA and Russia+  illustrate exporting regions, India+ - developing 
importing countries, Europe -  developed countries ( Supplementary Figure 10 shows the other six 
regions). “Solar, wind and geo.” indicates the aggregate change in solar, wind and geothermal power. 
Positive values of “Net change” indicate a decrease in the total primary energy supply, negative 
values – an increase. Supplementary Figures 11 and 12 show results under high oil prices. The 
regional definitions (Supplementary Tables 9 – 14) can influence the size of energy system changes. 
 
We tested the sensitivity of our findings against baseline assumptions (Supplementary Text 7, 
Supplementary Figures 14-17), oil and gas price de-coupling (Supplementary Text 8, 
Supplementary Figures 18-21) and higher production subsidies assumptions from ref. 24,25 
(Supplementary Text 9, Supplementary Table 18, Supplementary Figures 22-25). The 
emissions and energy systems impacts are generally robust across these uncertainties but 
changing socio-economic baseline assumptions changes the projected emission reductions 
from some regional NDCs, which in turn changes the relationship between the NDCs and the 
effects of subsidy removal (Supplementary Text 7). 
Our finding that subsidy removal would have the largest impact on CO2 emissions in 
Russia+, MENA and Latin America is especially meaningful considering two features of the 
political economy of subsidies. The first is that subsidy removal could disproportionately 
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harm the poor in some countries26,27. The second is that today’s low oil prices pressure 
energy exporting states to reduce spending as government revenues shrink26. This provides a 
unique political opportunity to remove subsidies precisely where it would have the largest 
effect on emissions and impact a comparatively small number of people living below 
$3.10/day (Supplementary Table 19 and Supplementary Text 10). Conversely, in low-income 
regions subsidy removal would lead to smaller emission reductions and likely impact more 
people living below this poverty line. The frequently-voiced suggestion to couple subsidy 
removal with other emission reduction policies like carbon pricing12,15 or clean energy 
support schemes28,29 would not necessarily reduce the impact of subsidy removal on the poor 
unless specifically designed with this objective in mind. 
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